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The topic of cognitive foresight in non-human animals has received considerable attention
in the last decade. The main questions concern whether the animals can prepare for
upcoming situations which are, to various degrees, contextually or sensorially detached
from the situation in which the preparations are made. Studies on great apes have focused
on tool-related tasks, e.g., the ability to select a tool which is functional only in the future.
Dufour and Sterck (2008), however, investigated whether chimpanzees were also able
to prepare for a future exchange with a human: an object exchanged for a food item.
The study included extensive training on the exchangeable item, which is traditionally not
compatible with methods for studying planning abilities, as associative learning cannot
be precluded. Nevertheless, despite this training, the chimpanzees could not solve the
deferred exchange task. Given that great apes can plan for tool use, these results are
puzzling. In addition, claims that great ape foresight is highly limited has been based on
this study (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2010). Here we partly replicated Dufour and Sterck’s
study to discern whether temporally deferred and spatially displaced exchange tasks are
beyond the capabilities of great apes. In addition to chimpanzees we tested orangutans.
One condition followed the one used by Dufour and Sterck, in which the exchange items,
functional only in the future, are placed at a location that freely allows for selections by the
subjects. In order to test the possibility that the choice set-up could explain the negative
results in Dufour and Sterck’s study, our second condition followed a method used in
the planning study by Osvath and Osvath (2008), where the subjects make a forced
one-item-choice from a tray. We found that it is within the capabilities of chimpanzees
and orangutans to perform deferred exchange in both conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen a number of studies on episodic-like
memory and foresight in animals, primarily on corvids and great
apes (e.g., Clayton and Dickinson, 1998; Raby et al., 2007; Osvath
and Osvath, 2008; Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). The positive results
in several of these studies suggest that the underlying cognitive
system, to some extent, can be compared to the human episodic
system. The human system provides the ability to remember
events and cognitively construct potential future events from a
subjective perspective, often including contextual elements such
as “when,” “where,” and “what” information. The episodic sys-
tem is usually contrasted with the semantic system, which is
also declarative, but concerns general knowledge unrelated to
an explicit event. (For a review on the episodic system see e.g.,
Szpunar, 2010).
Regardless of whether there is an episodic component associ-
ated with the future directed behaviors of the animals in ques-
tion, it remains important to study such behaviors in detail.
Future directed behaviors exhibited in such studies appear diffi-
cult to explain by merely associative learning of key stimuli, or
by rigid mechanisms, such as fixed action patterns (e.g., Raby
and Clayton, 2009; Osvath, 2010). Cognition underlying future
directed behavior, which seem not purely governed by the law
of effect or innate responses, epitomizes some of the hardest
problems within cognitive science: how matter (i.e., the brain)
can be about something that does not yet exist (i.e., the future).
Nevertheless, we know with some certainty that many brains can
do this, e.g., all those of normal adult humans.
Current methods in the research on animal cognitive fore-
sight are influenced by views forwarded by Wolfgang Köhler in
the 1920s. Köhler studied the cognition of chimpanzees, and
described his observations of chimpanzees anticipating events
that were “planned acts of the animal itself” (Köhler, 1921). In
the cases Köhler studied, however, the rewards were always visi-
ble. That is, a key stimulus of the goal of the planning action was
available for sensory feedback. Köhler argued that it would be an
even bigger achievement if the chimpanzee could make prepara-
tions for events that were not yet within sight. Köhler suggested
an experimental protocol for such a study: a two-room paradigm,
in which one room contains a reward, and the other room holds
the means of getting the reward. Access to the rooms is temporally
separated.
Today, there exist only a few studies on the abilities of great
apes to act toward future goals where the goals are outside the
animal’s current sensory scope. (Mulcahy and Call, 2006; Dufour
and Sterck, 2008; Osvath and Osvath, 2008; Osvath, 2009; Osvath
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and Karvonen, 2012). (For studies on corvids see Correia et al.,
2007; Raby et al., 2007; Cheke and Clayton, 2012, and on mon-
keys Bourjade et al., 2012; Dekleva et al., 2012). The experimental
studies have roughly followed Köhler’s protocol with the two-
room paradigm. Two studies have focused on great ape abilities
to select, transport and save tools that are useful only in a future
context (Mulcahy and Call, 2006; Osvath and Osvath, 2008). An
additional study, on chimpanzees, included the same tool-using
paradigm, but also, and mainly, investigated conditions based on
the ape having to select an item that after a delay of 1 h could
be exchanged for a food reward from a human (Dufour and
Sterck, 2008). This study relied heavily on training the animals to
exchange a certain object type. It might therefore not be regarded
as a planning study in a tradition in which an exclusive reliance on
associative learning is precluded. This does not make the results
less interesting, however.
The two studies solely based on tool use showed that
chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans are capable of select-
ing an appropriate tool well in advance of its use. Bonobos
and orangutans could keep the tool overnight (14 h per trial)
(Mulcahy and Call, 2006). One of the studies showed that
orangutans and chimpanzees could disregard an immediate, but
smaller, favorite reward in favor of the tool that offered the means
of attaining a future, larger, reward (Osvath and Osvath, 2008).
Furthermore, this study controlled for whether the apes behaved
toward the tool as if it was merely a reinforced stimulus, conclud-
ing that associative learning alone could not explain the results
(see also Osvath, 2010).
The study by Dufour and Sterck (2008), concentrating primar-
ily on future exchange in chimpanzees, yielded puzzling results.
In the tool-using condition, which was a replication of one part
of the studies described above (i.e., Mulcahy and Call, 2006), the
chimpanzees were successful. The subjects did, however, not suc-
ceed in selecting a heavily reinforced item that was usable in a
future exchange with a human experimenter. Suddendorf and
Corballis (2010) have forwarded that these results show that great
ape foresight is surprisingly poor. Regardless of whether this is a
correct assumption or not, there are at least two reasons why these
results are noteworthy.
The first reason is that the results of Dufour and Sterck (2008)
confirm that great apes do not merely rely on associative learn-
ing of a target item in future directed tasks. The item designated
for the future exchange was reinforced a high number of times in
an immediate context, i.e., in training on exchange. It was then
tested and confirmed that the subjects understood its token sta-
tus. Despite this extensive training in an immediate context, the
chimpanzees failed to perform the exchange when a delay was
introduced between the presentation of the item and the exchange
event. That is, they did not “blindly” collect the objects with
the most reinforcement history, which would be the prediction
if associative learning of the target item alone explains the results
in some of the above tests on future tool-use.
Secondly, the results might indicate that the task of deferred
exchange represents a domain where future-directed cognition
in chimpanzees is restricted. The authors of the study speculate
that it might be a result of the cooperative nature of the task (“I
give you what you want, and you give me what I want”), which
is a context that in general has been suggested to be more cog-
nitively demanding for chimpanzees than competitive contexts
(e.g., Hare and Tomasello, 2004). Indeed, other studies suggest
that chimpanzees can plan for agonistic encounters, and even plan
for deception (Osvath, 2009; Osvath and Karvonen, 2012). The
authors further consider that the exchange task might have fur-
ther types of social complexity built into it that can be difficult
for chimpanzees. For example, memories of the human exchange
partner’s reaction, e.g., as “unwilling” to give food, in cases where
the chimpanzee failed to bring the correct item, might interfere
with the memories of one’s own choices that brought about this
response. That is, it can be difficult for the animal to connect the
events into a correct causal chain.
It is also important to mention that a recent study on brown
capuchins (Cebus appella) and Tonkean macaques (Macaca
tonkeana), using the same paradigm on future exchange, also
yielded negative results (Bourjade et al., 2012). It is not clear,
however, whether these results reflect the same factors that made
the chimpanzees fail. Another recent study on monkeys, which
to some extent was a replication of Osvath and Osvath (2008),
showed that long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) would
not select, transport and use a tool for a future purpose, not even
if they received immediate cues of the reward, unless being sub-
jected to extensive shaping (Dekleva et al., 2012). Thus, it may
be that monkeys differ from great apes in their cognitive and/or
learning systems underlying future-directed behavior.
Exchange tasks as such, when not deferred, usually pose few
problems for great apes. The exchange of items with a human
for food rewards typically develops spontaneously in chim-
panzees (e.g., Hyatt and Hopkins, 1998; Brosnan and de Waal,
2005). Something that seems to require more explicit train-
ing is learning the relative values of exchangeable items (e.g.,
Brosnan and de Waal, 2005). Even when the reward differences
are maximized (i.e., reward vs. no reward), the learning of dif-
ferentially valued exchange items is not immediate (see e.g.,
training in Pelé et al., 2009). A further complicating factor is that
an exchange situation with a social counterpart involves more
than the value of items, such as judgments of the prospect of
adequate reward. For example, chimpanzees typically hand out
objects in an exchange only when solicited by a human, and
not in the complete absence of one (Hyatt and Hopkins, 1998).
That bartering is socially modulated is especially well-illustrated
in studies of inequity aversion in capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) (van Wolkenten et al., 2007) and chimpanzees (Brosnan
et al., 2010), where a previously successfully exchanged token
may be discarded, seemingly in protest, in response to the more
favorable exchanges taking place between the experimenter and
another subject. That the previous attempt to establish deferred
exchange in chimpanzees failed might thus have its basis in
social modulation, or the lack thereof, rather than the future
directedness of the activities as such. A replication is therefore
warranted.
In order to discern whether the ability for deferred exchange
with humans is outside the cognitive scope of great apes,
the current study aimed to replicate the main experiment
of Dufour and Sterck (2008) with subjects with everyday
experience of direct exchange with humans. We also added
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orangutans (Pongo abelii) to the pool of chimpanzees, in order
to phylogenetically trace the abilities to the most distantly related
great ape species to humans and chimpanzees, and to com-
pare with the results in Osvath and Osvath (2008). Two of the
subjects (one chimpanzee and one orangutan) in the current
study participated also in that study. Two main conditions were
used: (1) one-item-forced-selection, and (2) multiple-items-free-
selection.
Condition (1), used in Experiment 1, followed the item selec-
tion procedure used in a study on planning for future tool-
use by Osvath and Osvath (2008). The subject was offered
to select only one of four items from a selection tray oper-
ated by a human experimenter. In the current study, one
of these items had previously been reinforced in imme-
diate exchange training. The three other objects served as
distractors.
Condition (2), used in Experiment 2, was similar to the selec-
tion procedure used in Dufour and Sterck (2008), which in turn
followed the procedure in Mulcahy and Call (2006). The four
items were placed on the floor in a compartment, which was
later opened to allow access for the subject to enter and collect
any number of items. In this condition no humans were present
during the selection opportunity.
This division of conditions was used because of the possi-
bility that the different procedures might influence the results.
That is, if the apes would succeed in condition (1) but not in
condition (2), then the negative results in Dufour and Sterck
(2008) might be explained by the method. One of the reasons
for assuming a possible difference is that the performance of the
apes in Osvath and Osvath (2008) seemed slightly better than in
Mulcahy and Call (2006) in which multiple-items-free-selection
was used. Arguably, the situation in which the animal gets one
trial to choose only one item might be clearer or less distracting
to the animal, than when faced with the opportunity to select
several items during an extended time. The task can be said
to be more structured, or “clean,” in condition (1). But despite
these differences apes seem to be able to perform at a significant
level when it comes to tool-using tasks in both conditions. So
there likely are additional aspects of complexity when it comes
to deferred exchange. One candidate factor is that the human
who is present during the object choice in condition (1) repre-
sents a bartering partner, which might elicit an expectation of
an exchange. Or, in a similar vein, the human constitutes a cue
for the future situation where a human will also be present; so
called cued recall (Berntsen et al., 2013) In condition (2), on
the other hand, the presence of an object on its own, with its
history of being functional in a social context, might not evoke
the same actions without a triggering social cue. Alternatively or
additionally, selecting in front of a human could be a form of
explicit communication where the subject expresses a desire (for
similar ideas on selecting for exchange in front of a human see
Brosnan and de Waal, 2005). For these reasons we predicted that
condition (1) would constitute a situation in which the apes had
it easier to solve the task. Finally, irrespective of condition, per-
haps physical contexts, like reward apparatuses, represent more
concrete “futures” for an ape, than do the variable presence of
humans.
PREFERENCE TESTING
Before training was undertaken, subjects were tested in a selection
procedure for their potential spontaneous preferences for the dif-
ferent items. This was done to make sure that the subject actually
learned the value of the exchangeable item in the training phase.
If the subject would have a spontaneous preference for the item
designated for exchange, then it could superficially pass the learn-
ing criterion (see below). That is, the reason for the selection of
the correct item could be the result of a spontaneous preference
and not a response to training.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics statement
All procedures were performed in compliance with relevant laws
and institutional guidelines. Participation was voluntary and test-
ing was approved by Uppsala regional ethics committee (approval
no. C356/9). The Swedish Agricultural board (No. 31-2599/09)
has approved Furuvik Zoo as a cognitive research facility on
chimpanzees and orangutans.
Subjects
Two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and two orangutans (Pongo
abelii) participated in the study. Both chimpanzees were females,
Manda and Maria-Magdalena. The orangutans consisted of one
male, Naong, and one female, Dunja.
Subjects were tested at Lund University Primate Research
Station in Furuvik Zoo. At the time of testing, the participants had
experienced few previous experimental tests, and none requir-
ing object exchange. One chimpanzee, Maria-Magdalena, and
one orangutan, Naong, had previously taken part in a planning
experiment involving selection of items from a tray (Osvath and
Osvath, 2008), and the chimpanzee Manda had experience of
choice procedures from participation in an object-choice task
(Zlatev et al., 2013). In addition, Naong had extensive experi-
ence of various object-choice procedures, requiring the selection
of items (unpublished). All subjects had frequent exchange expe-
rience outside of testing.
The individuals were tested in their caretaking compartments,
as well as in larger indoor areas. No public visitors were present at
the time of testing. No changes in feeding procedures were made
and access to water was continuous. Some changes in indoor
housing routines were made to minimize disturbance from group
members.
Materials
Four different objects were used in the selection procedures. A
piece of blue plastic rope, a piece of jute cloth, a wooden rod,
and a strip of bent metal (see Figure 1). The metal was the object
later chosen to serve as target item in the exchange tasks (see
below). The items were placed equidistantly on a 60-centimeter
wide selection tray.
PROCEDURE
Each subject received 15 presentations of the tray baited with the
four objects. The tray was slid toward the subject and was then
retracted as soon as a selection had been made, thereby allowing
the subject to choose only one item. A choice was scored when
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FIGURE 1 | Choice items used throughout the study. From left to right:
wooden rod, jute cloth, plastic rope, metal strip (the exchangeable item).
The ruler units are in centimetres.
the animal touched or grabbed one of the objects. If the tray was
retracted before the subject had managed to grasp the object, the
one touched by the subject was handed over. The criterion for
a “refusal” to select was when the subject entered the selection
situation, looked at the items but did not attempt to touch any of
them before leaving.
All subjects but the orangutan female had previous experience
of this type of procedure. The order of the items was pseudo-
randomized between trials. The experimenter handling the tray
did not gaze at the items but slightly above or at the face of the ape.
RESULTS
Naong selected the piece of rope 3 times, the wooden rod 4 times,
the jute cloth 1 time, and the piece of metal 3 times; in 4 tri-
als he refused to select. The other orangutan, Dunja, selected
the wood 2 times and refused to select in the rest of the trials.
Manda selected the wood 12 times, the rope 2 times, and the jute
1 time. Maria-Magdalena selected the wood 12 times, the rope 2
times and refused to select once. No spontaneous preference thus
existed for the metal strip at the onset of training for any of the
subjects.
TRAINING
PROCEDURE
Subjects and materials were identical to the preference testing
described above. The four subjects were trained until able to reli-
ably exchange the target item (the metal strip) in a direct setting
with no time delay. On the initial trials only the target item was
placed in the enclosure and experimenter pointed to this and
requested the “grunka” (Swedish for “the thingamajig”). Later all
items were placed simultaneously into the enclosure and, pointing
if needed, the experimenter asked for the “grunka.” On successful
exchanges the subject was rewarded with verbal praise and a food
item consisting of approximately a fifth of a banana. If the subject
handed the wrong item back, the experimenter again pointed to
the target item and asked for the “grunka.” In later learning trials
pointing was phased out when the subject collected the target
item without coaxing.
Successful learning was corroborated in tests of learning, in
which 4 out of 5 trials had to be correct, which was followed by a
second test (a test of retention) also requiring 4 out of 5 successful
exchanges. Tests of learning and first test of retention were given
on two consecutive days (except for Dunja who, due to practical
reasons related to housing, received her first test of retention later
the same day as she met the learning criteria).
Additional retention tests, which functioned as warm ups,
were given for each new day of participation in the experimental
conditions. These did not always amount to a full 5 trials before
testing started, depending on how well the subject performed
and/or on how motivated the animal appeared on the particular
day.
In the tests of learning and retention the subject was not cued
by pointing or gaze toward a particular choice object, instead the
experimenter looked directly at the ape or at a point beyond it.
The items were presented in a different area than the exchange.
Tests of learning and tests of retention, all took place by present-
ing the items onto the cage floor, i.e., they were not given on a
selection tray. The exception was for the female orangutan sub-
ject (Dunja) who had little previous experience of choosing from
a tray, and appeared to be wary toward the tray. Thus, she received
additional training trials using the selection tray. By using a test
of learning and a retention test with a set criterion (80% success),
we could make sure that all the subjects could perform the task in
an immediate setting.
RESULTS
All subjects swiftly learned to hand out the target item at the
expense of the other items in exchange for food (and verbal
praise). The average number of trials required before we decided
to test their learning against the criteria was 8.5 ± 3.9 (5–14
trials). All subjects met, and exceeded, the criteria in the sub-
sequent test of learning: 5 out of 5 trials. All subjects also met,
and exceeded, the criteria in their first test of retention: 5 out of 5
trials.
EXPERIMENT 1—ONE-ITEM-FORCED-SELECTION
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
One chimpanzee, Manda, and the two orangutans participated
in this experiment. The other chimpanzee refused to take part
in the experiment. The chimpanzee and one orangutan, Naong,
received this experiment as their first test in the study, while the
other orangutan had already been tested in Experiment 2. The
chimpanzee that refused Experiment 1 had previously completed
Experiment 2.Manda was tested in this experiment at the age of 5.
Dunja was tested at the age of 21. Naong received his first 4 trials
at the age of 20, and the other 9 trials at the age of 22. This split in
time was due to circumstances unrelated to the study. We judged
it to be more conservative to resume with 9 trials instead of com-
pleting a new set of 13 trials at this later occasion, as the first 4
trials could be seen as unwarranted training on the deferred task.
Naong did not receive additional training after 2 years before
the 9 trials, only a test of retention, which he passed (5 out of 5).
Continued good performance after a 2-year hiatus is arguably a
testament to a profound ability to solve the task.
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Materials
The selectable items in this experiment were identical to the ones
used in the preference testing and training. The metal strip was
the target item used in the deferred exchange for food. The food
reward was approximately a fifth of a normal sized banana.
PROCEDURE
The procedure was similar to the one described in Preference test-
ing. However, the experimenter (E1) operating the tray during
the selection phase differed from the experimenter (E2) who per-
formed the deferred exchange. Both experimenters were known to
the subjects, but E1 had not been involved in the prior exchange
training. Furthermore, the deferred exchange was made at a
different location, out of sight, from the location of the selec-
tion. These additions were made to preclude sensory feedback
from elements pertaining to the goal situation, other than the
exchangeable item and the general presence of a human. The delay
between the selection and the exchange was 15min. The time
of delay was chosen for practical reasons. The exact length of
the delay plays a minor role in these types of tests as long as
the selection and the exchange is parted in space and by a time
span exceeding the period of storage in the working or short term
memory (compare to e.g., performances of episodically amnesic
patients, e.g., Tulving, 1985). After the delay, E2 showed up at the
exchange location and initiated interaction with the subject. E2
held the reward, visible to the subject, in one hand and extended
the other hand and asked for the item in a way identical to the
training sessions. The question and gesture was repeated by E2
until it was clear that the subject had attended to the request and
either acted on it or ignored it. If the subject gave the correct
item to E2 he or she received the reward. The chimpanzee and the
male orangutan, Naong, received 13 trials. The female orangutan,
however, received 14 trials because of an unclear selection in one
trial.
RESULTS
One chimpanzee, Manda, selected the correct object in 9 out of 13
trials (exact binomial test, p < 0.001). The correct selections were
made in trials number 4 and 6–13. She used the correct item in
the exchange 9 times (100% of the cases where the correct object
was selected. Exact binomial test, p < 0.001). Thus, the number
of complete behavioral sequences of selection, transportation and
exchange was 9 out of 13 times. Given the conservative assump-
tion that the chance for such success is 25% (due to the four
selectable items), this is also significant (exact binomial test, p <
0.001).
The male orangutan, Naong, selected the correct object in 12
out of 13 trials (exact binomial test, p < 0.001). He refused to
select in trial number 13. He used the correct item in the exchange
11 times (92% of the cases where the correct item was selected.
Exact binomial test, p < 0.001). In trial number 2 he did not
bring the correct item to the exchange. The number of com-
plete behavioral sequences (11 out of 13) was significant (exact
binomial test, p < 0.001).
The female orangutan, Dunja, selected the correct item in 11
trials out of 14 (exact binomial test, p < 0.001). The correct selec-
tions were made in trials number 1, 4–10, and 12–14. She refused
to select in trial number 2, and refused to show up at the exchange
location in 9 trials (number 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 9, 12, and 14). She never
brought the correct item to the exchange location. In 4 trials
(number 3, 7, 10, and 11) she tried to exchange items from the
enclosure (stick, bark, and pine needles). In one of these trials
(number 3) she had not selected the correct item. When Dunja
had chosen the correct item, she entered into the enclosure to
the male orangutan (through holes originally designed for letting
gibbons, but not orangutans, through), and the male took the
item from her each time (the male had already finished the two
experimental conditions). See Table 1 for overview of the results.
EXPERIMENT 2—MULTIPLE-ITEMS-FREE-SELECTION
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
In this experiment all four subjects took part. One chimpanzee,
Manda, was 7 years old, and one of the orangutans, Naong, was
22 years old, when they participated in the experiment. One of
the chimpanzees, Maria-Magdalena, at the age of 11, and one of
the orangutans, Dunja, at the age of 21, received this experiment
as their first experiment in the study. As 2 years had transpired
since Manda received Experiment 1, she was given a new set
of refreshment training consisting of 5 trials including only the
target item. She handed it out in all trials, as she did in the
subsequent retention test.
Table 1 | An overview of the results in the two experiments.
Subject Experiment 1: one-item-forced-selection Experiment 2: multiple-item-free-selection
Number of selections Number of exchanges Number of selections Number of exchanges
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
Manda (Pan troglodytes) 9*** 4 9*** 0 12*** 8 6*** 0
Maria-Magdalena (Pan troglodytes) Did not participate 7 n.s. 11 7*** 0
Naong (Pongo abelii) 12*** 1 11*** 1 7*** 1 7*** 1
Dunja (Pongo abelii) 11*** 3 0 n.s. 4 Did not enter selection room 0 2
In Experiment 1 all three subjects selected the target item significantly above chance, and two subjects exchanged the item significantly above chance (exact
binomial test). In Experiment 2 two subjects selected the target item above chance, and three subjects exchanged it above chance (the latter measure is based on
the coupling of the selections, including incorrect ones, with correct exchanges) (simulation in software R). ***p < 0.001.
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Materials
The selectable items and the food reward in this experiment were
identical to the ones described above. In this condition no selec-
tion tray was used, as the items were placed on the floor in a room,
similar to the condition described in Dufour and Sterck (2008).
However, our set-up differed slightly in that only one item per
category was present, instead of the multiple items per category
used by Dufour and Sterck.
PROCEDURE
The four selectable items were placed on the floor of a closed
compartment in the everyday enclosure. A hatch was then opened
and the subject was given access to enter the compartment. The
hatch was left open for a 15-min selection phase with no humans
present. The one handling the hatch was different from the one
who later performed the exchange. The closing was followed by a
15-min delay after which the experimenter asked the subject for
the exchangeable item at a different location. The exchange pro-
cedure followed the one described in Experiment 1. The behavior
of the subject in the compartment baited with the items was video
recorded. The video was then analyzed for the order in which the
items were touched and for what items were transported out of
the room.
RESULTS
One chimpanzee, Manda, brought the correct item out of the
selection compartment in 12 out of 12 trials. Additionally she
brought the rope 4 times (trial number 2, 3, 4, and 10), the wood
3 times (trial number 1, 2, 7) and the jute 1 time (trial num-
ber 1). This means that she brought the exchangeable item alone,
together with no additional objects, in 5 trials. Distractor objects
were never taken without also additional objects, and importantly
the target object. She exchanged the correct object in 6 trials.
As the subject could select more than one item in this set-
up, a standard binomial could not be used. Instead, we used
Monte Carlo simulation (Robert and Casella, 2004) to calculate
the p-value as the probability for an equal or greater number of
retrievals of the correct item than that given by chance. The actual
numbers of objects the subject selected were used for each of 50
000 simulated trials that were run in R (Robert and Casella, 2009).
The number of selections of the exchangeable item (the metal
strip) was significantly above chance (p < 0.001). Manda then
used the correct item for exchange in 6 out of 12 trials, and did
not try to exchange with any other object in the remaining 6 tri-
als. In order to reveal a potential relationship between the selected
and the exchanged item, i.e., whether she had a stronger tendency
to exchange when she actually had the rewarding item, we added
to the above simulation the exchange of the correct object, given
the number of objects that had been selected by the chimpanzee
(software R, n = 50.000). We considered a correct response to be
an exchange of the target item, as well as refusal to trade anything
if the target item had not been selected during the selection phase.
This simulation provided the null distribution of the amount of
correct behaviors for the subject. We then compared the observed
number of correct behaviors to this distribution, and the resulting
p-values represent the probability of finding an equal or greater
number of correct behaviors than by chance. In other words, this
gives the probability, in this particular set up, of both selecting and
exchanging the correct item by chance, considering the possibil-
ity that the other selected items could be used as well. Given this
method the responses of Manda were significantly above chance
(p < 0.001). The conservative, but less representative, measure
of complete behavioral sequences, from selection to exchange,
is, however, not significant (exact binomial test, (p = 0.11). The
video analysis showed that Manda, after having entered the room,
touched the exchangeable item (i.e., piece of metal) first in 11 out
of 12 trials.
The other chimpanzee, Maria-Magdalena, brought the correct
object out of the selection room in 7 out of 12 trials (trial number
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9). Additionally she brought the rope 5 times
(trial number 1, 8, 10, 11, and 12), the wood 4 times (trial num-
ber 1, 2, 8, and 10) and the jute 2 times (trial number 1 and 2).
This means that she brought the exchangeable item alone, with no
additional objects, in 6 trials, and that the rope was the only other
object that was ever taken with no additional object. This was
done on 2 occasions. According to the same method as described
above, the number of selections of the exchangeable item was not
significantly above chance (p = 0.094). Maria-Magdalena used,
however, the correct item for exchange in 7 out of 7 possible times
(100%), and did not try to exchange with any other object in the
remaining 5 trials. The same method as described above revealed
a significant correlation between the selected exchangeable item
and the exchanged items (p < 0.001). The number of complete
behavioral sequences, from selection to exchange, is significant
(exact binomial test, p < 0.05). The video analysis showed that
she first touched the exchangeable item in 6 trials.
One orangutan, Naong, only entered the compartment in 8
trials (trial numbers 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12). In 7 of these tri-
als he brought the exchangeable item. In one trial he brought the
rope and the wood piece (see below). This is significantly above
chance (p < 0.001, according to the first simulation described
above). He exchanged with the correct item in 7 out of 7 possi-
ble times, i.e., when he had the metal strip available to exchange
with. In one trial he tried to exchange with the wood piece. There
was a significant correlation between the selected exchangeable
item and the exchanged item (p < 0.001, according to the second
simulation described above). The number of complete behavioral
sequences, from selection to exchange, is significant (exact bino-
mial test, p < 0.05). The video analysis revealed that he always
touched the exchangeable item first, however, in one trial (num-
ber 11) he accidentally swept away the exchangeable item when he
entered the room. The item was displaced outside the mesh and
the orangutan tried to retrieve it without success, he then took the
rope and the wood and left the compartment.
The other orangutan, Dunja, refused to enter the compart-
ment in all trials, and refused to come to the location of exchange
in all trials but 4. In 2 of these cases she tried to exchange, once
with a piece of faeces and the other time with a sponge (enrich-
mentmaterial from the enclosure). To test whether Dunja actually
understood that the compartment contained exchangeable items,
three additional trials were run. In these trials she was coaxed into
the roomwith food that was placed next to the choice items on the
floor. In all cases she took the food and ignored any other items.
See Table 1 for overview of the results.
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DISCUSSION
This study did not attempt to directly study future planning,
understood as an action taken in the current situation with the
intention to reach a future goal, unrelated to the current psycho-
logical or perceptual state. It did, however, investigate behaviors
that in effect become future oriented, and as such might consti-
tute elements in planning acts. The goal was to discern whether
great apes indeed are incapable of using an arbitrary but rein-
forced object to make exchanges for food with humans after
a considerable delay, as has been suggested by the results in
Dufour and Sterck (2008). Our results show, contrary to the pre-
vious study that it is within the abilities of both chimpanzees
and orangutans. Importantly, the negative results of Dufour and
Sterck can no longer be taken as evidence for “surprisingly poor”
foresight capabilities in great apes, as has been done by e.g.,
Suddendorf and Corballis (2010).
This study, however, cannot in itself unambiguously distin-
guish what strategies the apes used to solve the tasks. There is a
possibility that the selection of the item and the later use of it
for exchange were, in a sense, cognitively separated. Given the
amount of training, the selection of the item could in this case
be the result of its status as a heavily reinforced stimulus. The
exchange, in turn, could be a result of a combination of the
reinforced action of handing out the target item to a human,
and a memory for whether the item had been selected and were
present in the enclosure or not. This would hold true also for the
significant results that seemingly demanded coupling of correct
selection with correct exchange [see e.g., (Dickinson, 2011), for
a discussion on the so-called mnemonic-associative theory which
can explain these types of results].
Regardless of whether one assumesmerely associative learning,
episodic planning, their combination, or something else, when
explaining the results, they must still be contrasted to the nega-
tive ones of Dufour and Sterck (2008). The subjects of that study
received a high amount of training on the exchangeable item. The
value of the item must have been as associatively learned as in
the current study. Thus, additional factors or mechanisms than
associative learning of the value of a key item are likely needed
for solving future oriented tasks like these. Something in addi-
tion to just the stimulus itself seems to be required to couple an
associatively learned stimulus to a future outside the current sen-
sory scope. This is further suggested by other studies in which the
same species that were involved in the current study, indeed some
of the same individuals, were shown to plan without relying on
associative learning as the only or main mechanism (e.g., Osvath
and Osvath, 2008; Osvath, 2010).
It is obvious that learning plays a pivotal role when it comes
to couple objects with valuable exchangeability, and the situa-
tions in which such exchanges can be made. One could speculate
that, apart from learning the value of the key stimuli, it might
be necessary to learn more abstract relationships. For exam-
ple that humans are reliable exchange partners over time. To
be able to perform deferred exchange the ape might need more
experiences, in several contexts, of humans as stable bartering
partners. Acting future orientedly toward static objects in the
environment, e.g., a nut tree or a reward apparatus, even if
they are out of sight, could be a simpler task as such things
are less changing in comparison to the dynamic behaviors of
others.
No systematic differences between the results of Experiment
1 and 2 could be found. As the conditions differ in setup and
require different statistics, direct comparisons are not possible. A
comparison would only be useful if, across subjects, one condi-
tion would yield significant results and the other would not. Even
then, given the few number of subjects of this study, it would still
only be an indication. Nevertheless, it was shown that apes could
successfully manage both conditions, and, despite the small num-
ber of subjects, the study thus answers the question of whether
deferred exchange is possible for great apes in the affirmative.
Two subjects in this study, Maria-Magdalena and Naong, also
participated in a study on planning for tool use (Osvath and
Osvath, 2008). In the current study Maria-Magdalena partici-
pated only in one condition, which is not immediately com-
parable to the selection phase in the baseline condition in
Osvath and Osvath. However, one can use a conservative mea-
sure, by calculating the number of successful complete behavioral
sequences, from selection to use of the items. When compar-
ing the results of the baseline condition in Osvath and Osvath
(2008)—where a functional tool had to be selected and trans-
ported to a different location in the future—with the results in
the current study, both subjects performed significantly above
chance in both studies (exact binomial tests, Maria-Magdalena
Experiment 2, this study: p < 0.05; in the baseline in the pre-
vious study: p < 0.001; Naong Experiment 1, this study: p <
0.001; Experiment 2: p < 0.05; baseline in the previous study:
p < 0.001).
When it comes to the poor performance of the female
orangutan, Dunja, one can only speculate. There could be sev-
eral reasons for her results. She did indeed select the correct item
in Experiment 1 significantly above chance, but did not get the
chance to show whether she would exchange it or not in the
future, as she after selection always returned to the male who
took the item. One could of course reason that such behavior
would be a sign of poor maximation of future rewards, but it
could also be that the company of the male was more rewarding
than a fifth of a banana. Interestingly, she did not ever attempt
to take the item in Experiment 2, not even when coaxed into the
room containing the objects. It can be that the mere presence of a
human—a close up and potentially interactive partner—was the
relevant factor for success, but we cannot know. There is one con-
spicuous difference in background between Dunja and the rest
of the subjects. Dunja arrived at the zoo only 1 year before the
study, while the rest of the subjects had been at the zoo for many
years. At Furuvik Zoo the apes routinely exchange objects for food
with the caretakers. This is a skill the zoo upholds in order to
make the apes pick up objects from inside the compound that
should not be there. When it comes to Dunja the background
is less clear. Her previous caretakers reported that she did spon-
taneously and frequently engage in exchanging objects (mainly
faeces) for food rewards at her former zoo from a young age.
Without targeted studies, however, we do not know if there are
systematic differences in the exchange behaviors between the two
zoo environments. There might be a possibility that a difference
in long-term experiences could explain the results. Relating to this
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issue, it would be interesting to know the background experiences
of the chimpanzees in the study of Dufour and Sterck (2008).
In any case, this study shows that it is within the capacity of
apes to succeed in deferred exchange. More studies are needed
to understand more precisely what type of future oriented tasks
apes can solve and why, including the possible effect of individual
background experience.
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